Abstract. The Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF) provides a means to define (or present) logics. It is based on a general treatment of syntax, rules, and proofs by means of a typed A-calculus with dependent types. Syntax is treated in a style similar to, but more general than, Martin-Lof's system of arities. The treatment of rules and proofs focuses on his notion of a judgment. Logics are represented in LF via a new principle, the judgrrzents as~pes principle, whereby each judgment is identified with the type of its proofs. This allows for a smooth treatment of discharge and variable occurrence conditions and leads to a uniform treatment of rules and proofs whereby rules are viewed as proofs of higher-order judgments and proof checking is reduced to type checking. The practical benefit of our treatment of formal systems is that logic-independent tools, such as proof editors and proof checkers, can be constructed.
. The formal system of LF is based on a typed A-calculus with first-order-dependent types that is closely related to several of the AUTOMATH languages. Its proof-theoretic strength is quite low (equivalent to that of the simply typed A-calculus ). In fact, the LF type system is chosen to be as weak as possible so as to provide scope for the development of practical unification and matching algorithms for use in applications [16, 44] . The type system has three levels of terms: objects, types (which classify objects), and kinds (which classify families of types). There is also a formal notion of definitional equality, which we take to be~-conversion; all matters relating to encodings of logics are treated up to this equality.
A logical system is presented by a signature that assigns kinds and types to a finite set of constants that represent its syntax, its judgments (or assertions), and its rule schemes. We write I' t-z a for an arbitrary assertion of one of the forms r k K, I' E A: K, or r & M: A. The rules for deriving the formation assertions of the LF type theory are given in Figure 1 . If U~*U'amiUd* W, then there exists V SLlch that U' -* V and U" j * V. The following are derilled rules:
(1) Weakening:
If r k= CYand *Z r. r', fkn r, r' >>~. It should be noted that since the LF type system is considerably richer than the system of arities, it is correspondingly better able to provide a natural representation of syntax (see, e.g., the encoding of higher-order logic given below).
In this section, we consider the representation of the abstract syntax of first-order logic [49] and higher-order logic [6] . For the sake of specificity, we assume in each case that the language of individuals is that of arithmetic. It will be clear that the method applies to any signature of first-order and higher-order logic. We shall treat the first-order logic example in some detail in order to illustrate the issues involved. The presentation of the abstract syntax of first-order logic will form a part of the signature~~o~(in the next section we discuss the extension of~~o~to represent rules and proofs).
Similarly, the presentation of the abstract syntax of higher-order logic will form a part of the signature ZHO~. 
ex(t x 24) = xE.y(t)Ex(LL). 
E.Y($JD *) == Ex($P)E.y(lj), 6 .Y(VX. $L2)= wAx:L.6,y,
ln the clauses for V and 3 we assume that x is chosen so that x G X, and we write X, x for X U {x}. 
which is the encoding of (VX.X = X)~(3x.x = x).
3.2.
HIGHER-ORDER LOGIC. There are many ways to present higher-order logic (see, for example [1, 6, 51, 54] (1) The encoding e is a btjection between the simple functional types and the canonical forms of type holtype in Z~o~and the empty context. Moreouer, the encoding is compositional in that C( c + r) = E(c) =~(~).
( Figure 4 ) to LF terms as follows:
In the cases involving individual variables x and occurrence markers~, it is assumed that x and f are chosen to be the first such variable or occurrence marker (in some standard enumeration) not occurring in X or A, respectively. where II' = 8~,A(P'), u It is important to stress that the way in which we have defined the set of free variables in a proof is crucial to the correctness of the adequacy theorem. For example, is a valid proof of (Vx.~) o (2x.9 ).3 The variable y occurs free in the proof (as the argument to ALL-E), but not in its end formula. Nevertheless, it must be accounted for in the LF encoding; otherwise, the resulting term is not welltyped. By glossing over such details, the usual presentations of systems of natural deduction appear to "build-in" the assumption that the domain of quantification is nonempty, but we see from the LF representation that this is not the case.
The adequacy theorem deals with pure first-order logic over the language of the Peano arithmetic, but does not deal with the logic of equality or arithmetic.
One way to do this is to add suitable axiom and rule schemes to the natural deduction system sketched above. For example, we could add the substitution rule and the induction rule
(with the side condition that x not occur free in any assumption other than those discharged by the application of the rule). These rules are presented in LF by the declarations It is straightforward to extend the above formal treatment of natural deduction to include equality and arithmetic. 
HIGHER-ORDER LOGIC.
A natural deduction-style presentation of higher-order logic can be given along much the same lines as in the case of first-order logic. A difference is that one proves a formula p relative to an assignment K governing the free variables of the proofi the assignments are made explicit by writing them in parentheses after the formula p. The rules for equality include those for~~conversion; there is also a rule EQ governing the interaction between truth and equality. As in first-order logic, only an illustrative selection of rules is presented here; see Figure 5 . The remaining rules-including those for arithmetic and choice-present no additional difficulties. We turn now to the representation of higher-order logic in LF. We depart from Church [6] in that we use a natural deduction presentation, rather than a Hilbert-type system. We declare a constant in 2.0. representing the basic judgment form asserting that a formula is a logical truth. Since the formulas of higher-order logic are just the terms of o, we have the following declaration:
true: obj( o ) + Type. Another essential ingredient, needed in order to achieve the decidability property is strong normalization for~1 . The proof we give here is interesting for two reasons. The first is that it does not depend on the Church-Rosser property and is therefore applicable to LF with stronger notions of definitional equality.
The second is that it yields an interesting corollary as a by-product, the predicativity theorem.
THEOREM A7 (STRONG NORMALIZATION)
(1) If r R K, then K is strongly normalizing. 
If r t-M:
A, then Erase(M) can be yped in Cuny 's~pe assignment system, where Erase(M) denotes the untyped h-term obtoined f~om M by w+wauing ppe labels jizvw A-abstraction r.
The proof of strong normalization proceeds as follows. We start by defining "dependency-less" translations r of kinds and type families to S, the set of simple types over a given base type o, and I " 1, of type families and objects to We are now ready to prove the major result of this section, the decidability of the relations r E a. We achieve this by introducing an implementation-ori- given in Figure  7 make use of NF in the conclusion of the rule. We temporarily adopt the convention that such a rule does not apply unless the required normal form exists, for it will be a direct consequence of the soundness theorem given below that the normal forms in question will always exist. By an easy induction on the structure of terms U, we can easily see that there is at most one V such that r K U + V, and V is in normal form.
The relationship between the algorithmic system and the system of We are now ready to establish the crucial lemma:
LEMMA A16
(1) It can be recursillcly decided whether or not r * K * kind. The algorithmic system introduced to establish the decidability theorem is also extremely valuable for establishing the derivability of the structural rule of strengthening.
THEOREM A18 (STRENGTHENING).
Strengthening is a deril'ed ride: if r, x:U, r' I-a, then r, r r I-a prcn)ided that x e FV(r') U FV( a ). 
